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V.S. Ramachandran is professor
and director, Center for Brain and
Cognition, University of California
at San Diego and adjunct
professor at the Salk Institute, La
Jolla. He originally trained as a
physician but switched to
research in 1978 and obtained a
PhD in neurophysiology from
Trinity college, Cambridge. His
main contributions are in visual
psychophysics and behavioral
neurology. He has received many
honors including a fellowship at
All Souls college, Oxford, the
Ramon Y Cajal award from the
international neuropsychiatry
society, the Ariens-Kappers medal
from the Royal Nederlands
Academy of sciences, and the
presidential lecture award from
the American Academy of
neurology. He gave the Decade of
the brain plenary lecture at the
annual meeting of the Society for
neuroscience, and the 2003 BBC
Reith lectures. His books include
Phantoms in the Brain and A Brief
Tour of Human Consciousness.
What made you choose
Biology? Let me answer by
disagreeing with one of the
scientists you have already
interviewed, Steve Pinker (whom I
admire, by the way). He says that
we should not trust scientists’
recollections about their careers
because memories are highly
unreliable. Using a Pinker-style
evolutionary logic I would argue
the very opposite: memories are
highly reliable, otherwise we
would not have survived! The fact
that it is occasionally fallible does
not mean that memory should not
be trusted, any more than I should
not trust my senses just because I
occasionally hallucinate or enjoy
visual illusions!
I remember well why I got into
biology. I found physics too exact,
and sterile for my taste, and
psychology too woolly. Biology
was the right combination of
precision and complexity. When I
later got into human vision and
neurology, I found that they were
areas in which one could still do
‘Victorian’ style experiments that
could have been done 100 years
ago, but weren’t. You see I have
this perverse streak; I enjoy doing
things which make my
competitors say “That is so
simple; why didn’t I think of it?”, or
“It is too simple — it cannot be
right”.
A third, more mundane reason
is that I always enjoyed collecting
fossils and sea shells, and through
taxonomy and comparative
anatomy I became hooked on
evolution. Surprisingly,
evolutionary thinking is rare in
neurology, but it permeates every
aspect of my work, including my
early work on color and motion,
and the visual perception of object
shape from shading information,
and my recent speculations on
synesthesia, the evolution of
metaphor and autism. For
example, in 2000, I suggested that
the synesthesia gene(s) survived
because it makes some outliers in
the population more
‘metaphorical’ and creative; there
is a hidden agenda, as with the
sickle-cell anemia gene.
Were you a good student? Yes
and no; I was erratic. My
performance in science was
perfectly respectable, but in
languages, and humanities in
general, it was abysmal. But I also
surprised all my classmates when
a paper I sent to Nature when I
was just 20 was accepted and
published without revision!
Which paper had the most
influence on you? My early
interest in Vision was sparked by
Richard Gregory’s 1958 paper on
why the world remains stable
during eye movements (Eye
movements and the stability of the
visual world. Nature 182, 1214-
1216) and his subsequent
squabbles with Donald McKay. (I
think they were both right, by the
way.) And Bela Julesz’s papers
taught me that one could draw
important conclusions from
amazingly simple experiments.
Any scientific heroes? Michael
Faraday and Thomas Huxley.
Faraday moved a magnet within a
coil of wire and linked two entire
fields of physics: electricity and
magnetism. From this I learnt that
there is no correlation between
the sophistication of methodology
and technology and the
importance of the result. And
Huxley for his overall approach,
for his wit and pugnacity and for
bringing science to ‘the common
people’ — his phrase — without
dumbing it down.
Also the unknown Indian genius
in the first millennium BC who
combined the use of place value
in number representations, base
10 (far more practical than the
Sumerian 60) and, most
importantly, zero as an
independent number and place
holder. This marks the dawn of
mathematics.
What about modern-day
heroes? Richard Gregory, Norm
Geschwind and Francis Crick, all
of whom have had more sheer fun
doing science than anyone else I
know.
Do you think the peer review
system works? I can do no better
than quote Semir Zeki: “referees
are swine but sometimes swine
can lead you to the truffle”.
What is the best advice you
have ever been given? All from
Francis Crick, as I pointed out in a
recent memorial at the Salk
Institute (The astonishing Francis
Crick. Perception 33, 1151–1154).
First, the importance of sheer
intellectual daring — chutzpah. It
is better to tackle ten fundamental
problems and solve one than to
tackle ten trivial ones and solve
them all! Fundamental problems
are not necessarily more
inherently difficult than trivial
ones. Nature is not conspiring
against us to make fundamental
problems more difficult.
Second don’t become trapped
in a small, specialised cul-de-sac
just because you feel comfortable
or your immediate peers reward
you for it. Don’t strive for approval
from the majority of your
colleagues, but only for the
respect of those few exceptional
people at the top of your field
whom you genuinely admire. And
never listen to ‘experts’ — recall
how both Erwin Chargaff and
William Bragg strongly
discouraged Crick from pursuing
DNA!
Do you have a favorite
conference? I don’t like any of
them. I bet I could write a
computer program that randomly
strings together the key words
from this year’s abstracts at the
big neuroscience meetings and
produces perfectly acceptable
abstracts for next year. Of course
you don’t want to be an ostrich,
but the danger for young people is
that they might get drawn into
fashionable trends instead of
tackling fundamental questions
starting from first principles.
Why the interesting in
popularizing science? I do it for
three reasons. First, because it is
fun. Second, we owe it to the tax-
paying public whose patronage we
enjoy. And third, as a reaction to
the phase we went through when it
was not considered the ‘proper’
thing for a researcher to do. There
are many outstanding scientists
who now “popularize” science in
their spare time: Lewis Wolpert,
John Barrow, Steve Pinker,
Stephen Hawking, Roger Penrose,
Edward Wilson, and Mike
Gazzaniga, to name just a few.
So overall it is a good thing to
do, although inevitably there will
be a few envious colleagues who
secretly wish to do the same but
lack the talent. A greater danger is
that one might inadvertently
oversimplify some of the concepts
and offend some experts. But as
Lord Reith said, “There are some
people whom it is one’s duty to
offend”.
What are the key problems in
your field that interest you?
One is the neural basis of abstract
thinking — how do we use
neurons to juggle ideas
sequentially in our heads? As
when you say: A is bigger than B,
B is bigger than C, therefore A
must be bigger than C. Is our
ability to make such a deduction
about the transitivity of relations
learned through induction, from
the way that, every time you saw
that A>B and B>C, then it always
turned out empirically that A>C?
And if so, is this ability to induce
rules acquired through learning or
hardwired through natural
selection? Did transitivity evolve
mainly to make beneficial social
inferences — that chap A just beat
up B, and B beat me up, so clearly
A is stronger than me and I had
better watch out for him — before
it was adopted for more abstract
thinking? If so, are the great apes
capable of transitive inferences in
a social situation but not for
abstract properties?
Another big question concerns
consciousness. Francis Crick and
Christof Koch galvanized the
scientific community by daring to
suggest — correctly, I believe —
that the nature of consciousness
is a tractable scientific question.
But I disagree with their specific
view that there are
“consciousness neurons” (I
suspect they were just being
provocative in proposing the
existence of such neurons). I think
that consciousness arises, not
from individual neurons nor from
the entire brain, but rather from
small specialized circuits unique
to — or very highly developed in
— humans which allow the brain
to create an explicit
‘metarepresentation’ of sensory
representations created at earlier
stages in the information-
processing pathway (which we do
share with lower primates). This is
accompanied by a sense of
‘agency’ and self and qualia, of
juggling symbols off-line entirely
in your brain and, especially, by
that feature which we consider
uniquely human — knowing that
you know or that you perceive
(qualia), or that you don’t know.
These abilities are all closely
interdependent in a way that we
don’t yet clearly understand. What
I’m calling the metarepresentation
bears an uncanny resemblance to
the ‘homunculus’ — but unlike the
homunculus it does not lead to an
endless regress. It bears the same
relationship to the earlier sensory
representations as the latter do to
external world events. Its purpose
is to create abbreviated
representations of representations
highlighting  certain aspects to
create tokens that can be used
for internal juggling of symbols —
‘thinking’ — or for communicating
ideas to others. Both language
and one’s sense of ‘agency’ are
involved in this in some way that
we don’t yet clearly understand.
As I said in my Reith lectures,
the brain structures involved seem
to be the amygdala, the angular
gurus (‘abstraction’ on the left,
‘body image’ on the right), the
supramarginal gyrus and anterior
cingulate cortex (‘will and want’)
and Wernicke’s area (‘meaning’).
Find out how these circuits work
and how they interact and you will
have figured out what it means to
be a conscious human being —
just as the structural logic of DNA
dictates the functional logic of
heredity. Anatomy is destiny, as
Freud said.
Will neuroscience have to
confront ethical issues? The big
ethical dilemma will emerge in 3 to
500 years from now, when a
neuroscientist will be able to
transplant your brain into a vat in
a culture medium — I’m serious —
and artificially create patterns of
activity that will make you feel like
you are living the lives of Francis
Crick, Bill Gates, Hugh Heffner
and Mark Spitz, while at the same
time retaining your identity. Given
a choice, would you rather pick
this scenario or just be the ‘real’
you? Ironically most people I
know, even scientists who are not
religious, pick the latter on the
grounds that it is ‘real’. Yet there
is absolutely no rational
justification for this choice,
because in a sense you already
are a ‘brain in a vat’ — a vat called
the cranial vault, nurtured by
cerebrospinal fluid and
bombarded by photons. All I am
asking you is which vat you prefer
— and you pick the crummy one!
There is a sense in which this is
the ultimate ethical dilemma . I
personally would choose the ‘real’
me, by the way, although I don’t
know why. Maybe it is a
sentimental attachment to my
current reality or maybe I secretly
believe there is something else,
after all.
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